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The Resilience of Computationalism
Gualtiero Piccinini†‡
Computationalism—the view that cognition is computation—has always been contro-
versial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, com-
putation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections
from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural
processes have feature Y, and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) com-
putations. In this article, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections.
To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that
we need a better account of computation.
1. Introduction. Roughly speaking, computationalism says that cognition
is (a kind of) computation or that cognitive capacities are explained by
the agent’s computations. The cognitive processes and behavior of agents
are the explanandum. The computations performed by the agents’ cog-
nitive system are the proposed explanans. Since the cognitive systems of
biological organisms are more or less their nervous systems, we may say
that according to computationalism, the cognitive processes and behavior
of organisms are explained by neural computations.
Some people might prefer to say that cognitive systems are “realized”
by nervous systems and that according to computationalism cognitive
computations are “realized” by neural processes. In this article, nothing
hinges on the nature of the metaphysical relation between cognitive sys-
tems and nervous systems or between computations and neural processes.
For present purposes, if a neural process realizes a computation, then
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 599 Lucas Hall
MC73, 1 University Boulevard, University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO 63121; e-mail:
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that neural process is a computation. Thus, I will couch much of my
discussion in terms of nervous systems and neural computation.1
Before proceeding, we should dispense with a possible red herring.
Contrary to a common assumption, computationalism does not stand in
opposition to connectionism. Connectionism, in the most general and
prevalent sense of the term, is the claim that cognitive phenomena are
explained (at some level and at least in part) by the processes of neural
networks. This is a truism supported by current neuroscientific evidence.
Everybody ought to be a connectionist in this general sense.2 The relevant
question is, are neural processes computations? More precisely, are the
cognitively relevant processes carried out by nervous systems computa-
tions? Computationalists say yes; anticomputationalists say no. This ar-
ticle investigates the soundness of arguments against computationalism.
Computationalism has met a wide range of objections ever since Warren
McCulloch and Walter Pitts (1943) first proposed it. Yet computationalism
has become and remains the dominant theory of cognition in psychology,
neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This article explains why tradi-
tional objections are inconclusive and suggests a more effective strategy
for assessing computationalism.
There are two types of objection: (1) those based on alleged differences
between computations and cognitive processes and (2) those based on
alleged differences between computations and neural processes. We will
look at each type in turn.
Before proceeding, we ought to define ‘computation’ at least roughly.
To a first approximation, computation is what computers and similar
machines do. The paradigmatic computer—the electronic, programmable,
stored-program, universal digital computer—is the kind we use every day.
Of course, computationalism is not committed to the claim that the brain
is like such a computer in every respect but only to a partial analogy
between brains and computers. We will see that in order to assess the
objections to computationalism, it is crucial to distinguish the features of
computers that are essential to computation from those that are not es-
sential. I will argue that the shortcomings of current objections suggest
the need for greater precision on what does and does not count as com-
putation. A more precise account of computation is necessary to evaluate
the plausibility of computationalism.
1. See also Piccinini (2008a, 2008b, 2009, and forthcoming), for why computationalism
is to be tested by evidence about the nervous system.
2. There are other more specialized senses of ‘connectionism’. For a more nuanced
discussion of various senses of ‘connectionism’ and their relation to computationalism,
see Piccinini (2008b, 2009).
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2. Insufficiency Objections. There is a long tradition of arguments to the
effect that computation is insufficient for genuine cognition. These are
the most discussed objections to computationalism. Their general form
is as follows: cognitive phenomena include X, but computation is insuf-
ficient for X. Therefore, cognition is not computation. Candidates for X
include but are not limited to mathematical insight (Lucas 1961; Penrose
1994), qualia (Block 1978), intentionality or “understanding” (Searle
1980), abduction (Fodor 2000), embodiment (Thompson 2007), and em-
beddedness (van Gelder 1998). All these insufficiency objections are un-
sound.
To begin with, the reality or relevance of some X’s is controversial. For
some X’s, it may be questioned whether X is real or is a genuine feature
of cognition. For instance, someone might deny that qualia are real (Den-
nett 1988) or that the mind is embodied and embedded in a nontrivial
sense. Consider that neural systems can exhibit many of their characteristic
processes without being embedded, as the success of in vitro neurophysiol-
ogy attests. Alternatively, someone might argue that qualia, although real,
are not part of cognition proper. If so, then qualia fall outside the scope
of computationalism.
Furthermore, even among people who agree that a candidate X is real,
it may be controversial whether computation is sufficient for X. For in-
stance, many have argued that the power of mathematical insight does
not refute computationalism (e.g., Feferman 1995) or that qualia can be
given a computational account (e.g., Lycan 1987) or that abduction can
be done computationally. Each candidate X poses its own special chal-
lenges. There is no room here to review the complex issues associated
with each X. Fortunately, for present purposes we can skip the details,
for all objections of this type suffer from a more fundamental weakness:
even if computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X,
computationalism can be retained in its most plausible form. In its stron-
gest formulation, computationalism says that all cognitive phenomena
can be accounted for by computation alone. Few people, if any, hold this
view. The reason is precisely that some aspects of cognition, such as the
candidate X’s listed above, appear to involve more than computation.
A weaker and more plausible formulation of computationalism is that
computation is a proper part of the explanation of all or most cognitive
processes and behavior. This formulation is entirely adequate for the role
computationalism plays in science. Scientists who carry out computa-
tionalist research programs offer computational explanations of cognitive
tasks. Such explanations are usually formulated in terms of computations
over representations, presupposing some account of how the represen-
tations get their representational content. In some cases, such explanations
are formulated in terms of conscious states, presupposing some account
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of how the states get to be conscious. Finally, such explanations are often
formulated in terms of states and processes that are coupled with the
organism’s body and environment. Again, this presupposes that neural
computations are coupled with the body and environment in the relevant
way.
Thus, a complete explanation of cognition may require, in addition to
an appeal to computation, an account of the states’ consciousness, rep-
resentational content, embodiment, and embeddedness. Computation may
be insufficient for intentionality, consciousness, and so on, but it may still
be an important part of the explanation of cognitive processes and be-
havior.
As Mark Sprevak has pointed out to me, this concessive strategy only
goes so far. If insufficiency objections turned out to be not only correct
but correct to the point that computation only plays a minor role in the
explanation of a few cognitive processes, then computationalism would
lose most of its luster. In other words, if computation contributed little
to explaining cognition and solving the really hard problems (e.g., con-
sciousness and intentionality), then computationalism would no longer
be a very interesting and substantive view. But as they stand, the present
objections do not undermine the most interesting version of computa-
tionalism: the claim that neural computations are a necessary and im-
portant part of the explanation of most cognitive processes and behaviors
of organisms. To undermine such a view, we will have to get our hands
dirty and look at how nervous systems work.
In conclusion, insufficiency objections—to the effect that computation
is insufficient for X, for some feature X that cognition has—are incon-
clusive. At best they show that a complete theory of cognition involves
more than an appeal to computation—something that few if any people
deny.
3. Objections from Neural Realization. There is also a long tradition of
objections to computationalism based on alleged differences between neu-
ral processes and computations. Compared to insufficiency objections,
these objections from neural realization have been neglected by philos-
ophers. I will now discuss some important objections from neural reali-
zation and why they fail. Unlike the previous class of objections, each
objection requires a separate treatment.
3.1. Nonelectrical Processes. Like signals in electronic computers, neu-
ral signals include the propagation of electric charges. But unlike signals
in electronic computers, neural signals also include the diffusion of chem-
ical substances. More specifically, there are at least two classes of neural
signals that have no analogue in electronic computers: neurotransmitters
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and hormones. Therefore, according to this objection, neural processes
are not computations (e.g., Perkel 1990).
As it stands, this objection is inconclusive. Computations are realizable
by an indefinite number of physical substrates, so computing mechanisms
can be built out of an indefinite number of technologies.3 Today’s main
computing technology is electronic, but computers used to be built out
of mechanical or electromechanical components, and there is active re-
search on so-called unconventional computing such as optical, DNA, and
quantum computing. There is no principled reason why computations
cannot be realized by processes of chemical diffusion.
Even if the chemical signals in question were essentially noncompu-
tational, pointing out that they occur in the brain would not show that
neural processes are noncomputational. Here, different considerations ap-
ply to different cases. Many hormones are released and absorbed at the
periphery of the nervous system. So, the release and uptake of such hor-
mones might be treated simply as part of the input-output interface of
the neural computations, in the same way that sensory and motor trans-
ducers are.
With respect to neurotransmitters and neuropeptides, we need to re-
member that computational explanations apply at some mechanistic levels
and not others (e.g., Piccinini 2007b). For example, at one mechanistic
level, the activities of ordinary electronic computers are explained by the
programs they execute; at another level, they are explained by electronic
activity in their circuits; at yet another level, by quantum mechanical
processes. We should also remember that not all processes that occur in
a computing system are computations. As a counterexample, consider
temperature regulation: it occurs in all artificial computers, but it is not
part of their computations. So, anyone who wishes to appeal to chemical
signals as an objection to computationalism needs to show both that those
chemical processes are noncomputational and that they occur at the mech-
anistic level at which neural systems are purported to perform compu-
tations. This cannot be done without clear criteria for what does and does
not count as computation. And such criteria cannot be based simply on
whether the signals being used are chemical or electrical. The presence of
chemical signals in nervous systems, by itself, does not threaten compu-
tationalism.
3.2. Temporal Constraints. Neural processes are temporally con-
strained in real time, whereas computations are not; hence, neural pro-
cesses are not computations (e.g., Globus 1992; van Gelder 1998). This
3. This is not to suggest that every process is a computation—far from it (Piccinini
2007a).
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objection trades on an ambiguity between mathematical representation
of time and real time. True, computations are temporally unconstrained
in the sense that they can be defined and individuated in terms of com-
putational steps, independently of how much time it takes to complete a
step. More accurately, this point applies to algorithmic (i.e., step-by-step)
computations. Many neural networks that perform computations do so
without their computations being decomposable into algorithmic steps
(Piccinini 2008b), so the premise of this objection does not apply to them.
But the deeper flaw in this objection is that abstraction from temporal
constraints is a feature not of computations themselves but of (some of)
their descriptions. The same abstraction can be performed on any dy-
namical process, whether computational or not. Consider differential
equations—a type of description favored by many anticomputationalists.
Differential equations contain time variables, but these do not correspond
to real time any more than the time steps of a Turing machine correspond
to any particular real time interval. In order for the time variables of
differential equations to correspond to real time, a temporal scale must
be specified (e.g., whether time is being measured in seconds, nanoseconds,
years, etc.). By the same token, the time steps of a computer can be made
to correspond to real time by specifying an appropriate time scale. When
this is done, computations are no less temporally constrained than any
other process. As any computer designer knows, you cannot build a well-
functioning computer without taking the speed of components and the
timing of their operations into account (in real time). In fact, many com-
putationalists have been concerned with temporal constraints on the com-
putations that, according to their theory, explain cognitive phenomena
(Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990; Vera and Simon 1993).4
The two objections above share a common problem: the properties they
canvass (electrical signals, temporal constraints) are irrelevant to whether
a process is computational. It is easy to show that they miss their target.
The following objections are more promising because they are based on
properties that are relevant to whether neural processes are computations.
3.3. Analog versus Digital. Neural processes are analog, whereas com-
putations are digital; hence, neural processes are not computations (e.g.,
Dreyfus 1979; Perkel 1990). This is one of the oldest and most often
repeated objections to computationalism. Unfortunately, it is formulated
using an ambiguous terminology that comes with conceptual traps.
A common but superficial reply to this objection is that computations
4. Another rebuttal of the objection from temporal constraints—developed indepen-
dently of the present one—is given by Weiskopf (2004). Some of his considerations go
in the same direction as mine.
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may be analog as well as digital. After all, most people who work in this
area have heard of machines called ‘analog computers’. Analog computers
were invented before digital computers and were used widely in the 1950s
and 1960s. If neural processes are analog, they might be analog com-
putations, and if so, then computationalism remains in place in an analog
version. In fact, the original proponents of the analog-versus-digital ob-
jection did not offer it as a refutation of all forms of computationalism
but only of McCulloch and Pitts’s digital version of computationalism
(Gerard 1951). This reply is superficial, however, because it employs the
ambiguous terms ‘analog’ and ‘computation’. Depending on what is
meant by these terms, an analog process may or may not be an analog
computation, and an analog computation may or may not be a com-
putation in the sense relevant to computationalism.
In a loose sense, ‘analog’ refers to the processes of any system that at
some mechanistic level can be characterized as the temporal evolution of
real (i.e., continuous or analog) variables. Some proponents of the analog-
versus-digital objection seem to employ some variant of this broad notion
(e.g., van Gelder 1998). It is easy to see that neural processes fall in this
class, but this does not help us refute computationalism. On one hand,
most processes that are analog in this sense, such as the weather, planetary
motion, and digestion, are paradigmatic examples of processes that are
not computations in any interesting sense. Neural processes may fall into
this class. On the other hand, it is also easy to see that virtually all systems,
including computing mechanisms such as computers and computing neu-
ral networks, fall within this class. Continuous variables have more ex-
pressive power than discrete ones, so continuous variables can be used
to express the same information and more. But more importantly, most
of our physics and engineering of midsize objects, including much of the
physics and engineering of digital computers, is couched in terms of dif-
ferential equations, which employ continuous variables. So, the trivial fact
that neural mechanisms are analog in this loose sense does nothing to
either refute computationalism or establish an analog version of it.
In a more restricted sense, ‘analog’ refers to analog computers—a class
of machines that used to be employed for solving certain differential
equations.5 Analog computers are either explicitly or implicitly invoked
by many of those who formulate the analog-versus-digital objection.
Claiming that neural systems are analog in the sense that they are analog
5. The class of equations solved by analog computers is that of the differentially
algebraic functions, i.e., functions that arise as solutions to algebraic differential equa-
tions. Algebraic differential equations are equations of the form P(y, y′, y′′, . . . yn)p
0, where P is a polynomial with integer coefficients and y is a function of x (Pour-El
1974).
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computers is a strong empirical hypothesis. Since this hypothesis claims
that neural mechanisms are analog computing mechanisms, it may be
considered a form of computationalism. Nevertheless, this analog com-
putationalism is incompatible with the mainstream (digital) form of com-
putationalism, which is the one under discussion in this article.
But in spite of some valiant attempts to argue for something like this
analog version of computationalism (Rubel 1985), neural mechanisms and
analog computers are quite different. The principal difference is that the
vehicles of analog computation are real variables, namely, variables that
vary continuously over time, whereas the main vehicles of neural processes
appear to be neuronal spike trains, which are sequences of all-or-none
events. Of course, the rate at which a neuron fires can increase or decrease
in a graded way within certain limits. For this reason, firing rates are
sometimes called ‘analog’. But even firing rates are not real variables,
which can literally take any real value within the relevant interval. Once
again, the term ‘analog’ proves ambiguous.
Although it is implausible that nervous systems are analog computers
in a strict sense, they may still share some interesting properties with
them, while failing to share some interesting properties with digital com-
puters. For instance, it is plausible that the temporal evolution of neural
processes, like that of analog computers but unlike that of digital com-
puters, cannot be analyzed into functionally relevant discrete time inter-
vals. (Evidence: none of the mainstream studies of neural systems have
found any such functionally relevant discrete time intervals.) Whether this
point establishes that neural processes are not computations, however,
depends on whether discrete temporal evolution is essential to (digital)
computation. As I already pointed out, there are digital computing devices
(such as many neural networks) whose internal dynamics are not discrete.
Thus, even this disanalogy between brains and computers fails to establish
that neural processes are not (digital) computations. To determine whether
they are, more needs to be said about what counts as (digital) compu-
tation.
3.4. Spontaneous Activity. Neural processes are not the effect of inputs
alone because they also include a large amount of spontaneous activity;
hence, neural processes are not computations (e.g., Perkel 1990). The
obvious problem with this objection is that computations need not be the
effect of inputs alone either. Computations may be the effect of inputs
together with internal states. In fact, only relatively simple computations
are the direct effect of inputs; in the more interesting cases, internal states
also play a role. Perhaps the spontaneous activity of neurons is not quite
analogous to the internal states that affect computations. To say why,
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more needs to be said about spontaneous neural activity and the role it
plays vis-a`-vis internal states of computations and the roles they play.
While the first two objections appealed to properties that are simply
irrelevant to whether something is computational, these last two objections
fail primarily because they lack a precise enough account of what does
and does not count as computation (in the relevant sense). To make
progress on whether computationalism holds, we need a precise account
of computation.
4. How to Test Computationalism. As we have seen, objections to com-
putationalism fall into two main classes: insufficiency objections and ob-
jections from neural realization. According to insufficiency objections,
computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According
to objections from neural realization, neural processes have feature Y,
and having Y is incompatible with being a computation. In this article,
I explained why computationalism has survived these objections. Insuf-
ficiency objections are at best partial: for all they establish, computation
may be sufficient for cognitive phenomena other than X, may be part of
the explanation for X, or both. Objections from neural realization are
based on either a false contrast between feature Y and computation or
an account of computation that is too vague to yield the desired conclu-
sion.
To date, objections from neural realization have been ineffective for
lack of a precise enough account of computation. But their method is
sound. The method is to consider relevant functional properties of com-
putations, consider the evidence about neural processes, and see whether
neural processes appear to possess the relevant functional properties. In
order to improve on past debates over computationalism, we need to
identify general functional properties of computations and compare them
with relevant functional properties of neural processes.
In some of my recent work (Piccinini 2007b, 2008a, 2008b), I have
attempted to identify precisely such general functional properties of (dig-
ital) computations. Very briefly put, computations are processes whose
function is to produce output strings of “digits” (i.e., sequences of discrete
states) from input strings and (possibly) internal states, in accordance with
a general rule defined over the strings. I have also argued that my account
of computation captures the notion of computation relevant to (digital)
computationalism. To see whether computationalism holds, what remains
to be done is to analyze the neuroscientific evidence.
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